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 NOTE 
Missouri Court Limits the Reach of the 
Pollution Exclusion 
American National Property & Casualty Co. v. Wyatt, 
400 S.W.3d 417 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) 
KELLY GORMAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Insurance policies typically outline the types of liability that an insur-
ance provider will cover and those that the insurer will not.  One type of lia-
bility that has been highly litigated in recent decades has been liability for 
pollution related injuries or losses.1  Today, the provisions that contemplate 
this type of liability are called “pollution exclusion clauses.”2 
Pollution exclusion language, at its most basic level, sets out to limit an 
insurer’s liability for traditional environmental damage.3  Since its concep-
tion, however, insurers have argued that the exclusionary language extends to 
preclude liability for non-traditional environmental pollution damage.4     
Unfortunately, courts have not ruled on this issue with uniformity.5  In fact, 
one court has posited that “[r]arely has any issue spawned as many, and as 
variant in rationales and results, court decisions as has the pollution-exclusion 
 
 * B.S., Truman State University, 2008; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2015; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2014-2015.  I would 
like to thank the members of the Missouri Law Review for their many rounds of help-
ful edits and also Professor Peters for working as my advisor throughout this process. 
1. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAW AND 
STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS 825 (1994) (“One of the most hotly 
litigated insurance coverage questions . . . has been the scope and application of the 
pollution exclusion contained in the standard [general liability] policy.”); see also 
Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Wyatt, 400 S.W.3d 417, 422 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013); 
Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, What Constitutes “Pollutant,” “Contaminant,” 
“Irritant,” or “Waste” Within Meaning of Absolute or Total Pollution Exclusion in 
Liability Insurance Policy, 98 A.L.R. 5TH 193 (2002) (“The question of whether a 
particular material has been shown to be a substance within the scope of an absolute 
or total pollution exclusion has been the subject of much litigation.”). 
 2. Michael W. Peters, Insurance Coverage for Superfund Liability: A Plain 
Meaning Approach to the Pollution Exclusion Clause, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 161, 170-
71 (1987). 
 3. See id. 
 4. Wyatt, 400 S.W.3d at 422. 
 5. See Porterfield v. Audubon Indem. Co., 856 So. 2d 789, 800-01 (Ala. 2002). 
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clause.”6  Nevertheless, before American National Property & Casualty Co. 
v. Wyatt, no court in Missouri had directly addressed whether pollution-
exclusion language extended non-liability to “pollutants” that are not tradi-
tional environmental pollutants.7   In Wyatt, consequently, the Missouri Court 
of Appeals for the Western District faced the novel issue of interpreting an 
insurance policy’s pollution exclusion to determine whether it encompassed 
non-traditional pollutants.8 
This Note explains the conflicting viewpoints presented in Wyatt and 
how the court reached its conclusion that the pollution exclusion clause does 
not encompass non-traditional pollutants.  Part II of this Note describes the 
facts of Wyatt and the particular position of each party.  In Part III, this Note 
examines the history behind pollution exclusion language and the various 
forces that shaped its evolution.  Part IV then considers how other jurisdic-
tions have dealt with pollution exclusion clauses and what legal theories or 
principles shaped their decisions.  Finally, Part V argues that the Court of 
Appeals’ rejection of a more broad “pollution exclusion” better comports 
with the history behind pollution exclusion language and the reasonable ex-
pectation of policyholders. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 2010, Joyce Bentley drove her granddaughter, Megan Wyatt, and her 
granddaughter’s friend, Robin Ferguson, to her apartment for an overnight 
visit.9  Upon arrival, Megan Wyatt and Robin Ferguson exited the car in the 
driveway and entered Bentley’s apartment.10  Bentley then parked her car in 
the garage attached to her apartment.11  Bentley, however, failed to turn off 
the car’s engine before shutting her garage door and entering the apartment.12  
Later that day, police received a call from a neighbor about a suspicious 
odor.13  When the police arrived, they found Bentley’s vehicle with the en-
gine still running in the garage and the garage door closed.14  The police then 
 
 6. Id. at 800.  The court continued saying, 
Our review and analysis of the entire body of existing precedent reveals that 
there exists not just a split of authority, but an absolute fragmentation of au-
thority. Cases may be found for and against every issue any litigant has ever 
raised, and often the cases reaching the same conclusion as to a particular is-
sue do so on the basis of differing, and sometimes inconsistent, rationales. 
Id. 
 7. See Wyatt, 400 S.W.3d 417. 
 8. Id. at 419. 
 9. Id. at 418. 
 10. Respondent’s Brief, Wyatt, 400 S.W.3d 417 (No. WD 75226), 2012 WL 
5248672, at *6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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entered Bentley’s apartment where they found Bentley and Robin Ferguson 
unconscious and Megan Wyatt dead from carbon monoxide inhalation.15  
Bentley later died at the hospital.16 
Megan’s father, Randall Wyatt (Wyatt), as a result of the incident, filed 
a wrongful death claim against Bentley and her insurance provider, American 
National Property & Casualty Company (ANPAC).17  Robin Ferguson, by 
and through her father and next friend, also filed a negligence claim against 
Bentley and ANPAC.18  ANPAC, in response to the suits, filed a declaratory 
judgment in the Circuit Court of Jackson County.19  ANPAC argued that its 
liability policy did not cover the claims asserted against Bentley.20  In particu-
lar, ANPAC asserted that the pollution exclusion clause contained in Bent-
ley’s policy precluded coverage for the incident.21  The parties then filed 
cross motions for summary judgment.22  Circuit Court Judge James Kanatzar 
granted ANPAC’s motion and denied the plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that 
the pollution exclusion clause found in Bentley’s policy precluded cover-
age.23  The circuit court reasoned that “[a]n average layperson knows that 
automobile exhaust fumes have a toxic, potentially fatal effect, especially 
when inhaled by a person in a confined space and therefore would understand 
that automobile fumes which contain carbon monoxide are ‘pollutants.’”24 
Wyatt and Robin Ferguson (collectively, “the plaintiffs”) appealed.25 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the language in the pollution exclu-
sion clause was ambiguous and should have been construed against 
ANPAC.26  The plaintiffs further argued that a reasonable homeowner pur-
chasing the policy would not believe the policy excluded from its coverage 
damages caused by exposure to carbon monoxide within the home.27  The 
plaintiffs reasoned that reasonable policyholders would instead construe the 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at *7. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Wyatt, 400 S.W.3d 417, 419 (Mo. App.    
W.D. 2013). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  The relevant language in Bentley’s policy follows: 
Coverage E – Personal Liability and Coverage F – Medical Payments to Oth-
ers do not apply to bodily injury or property damage: . . . n. arising out of the 
actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, dispersal, seepage, migra-
tion, release, or escape of pollutants. . . . q. arising out of, caused by, contrib-
uted to, aggravated by or resulting from (whether directly or indirectly): . . (4) 
pollution or contamination. 
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 10, at *8-12. 
 22. Wyatt, 400 S.W.3d at 419. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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exclusion as being applicable in regards to traditional environmental pollu-
tants only.28 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District ultimately re-
versed the circuit court and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.29  In 
its unanimous opinion, the court acknowledged that the only issue on appeal 
was “whether, as a matter of law, ANPAC established that coverage was ex-
cluded under the language of the insurance contract.”30  The court then quot-
ed the governing principles of insurance policy interpretation under Missouri 
law and the actual policy at issue in the case.31  The court, in recounting the 
history of the pollution-exclusion clause, observed that “[w]hile barely 
touched upon in Missouri case law, ‘[t]he scope of [the pollution exclusion 
clause] has been described as one of the most hotly litigated insurance cover-
age questions to arise over the past three decades.’”32 
The court then analyzed the language in ANPAC’s policy and found that 
the provisions within the policy would appear on their face to provide broad 
liability coverage.33  The court went on to state that the language in the pollu-
tion exclusion clause did not unambiguously include non-traditional pollu-
tants in its exclusion.34  The court reasoned that such an expansive reading of 
“pollution” and “pollutant” (one that would include non-traditional pollu-
tants) was not consistent with what an ordinary person would consider a pol-
lutant.35  Ultimately, the court held that a pollution-exclusion clause cannot 
be read in isolation but must, instead, be construed in the context of the entire 
policy and in light of a reasonable person’s expectations.36 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
General liability policies, which protect the insured against most claims 
of bodily injury or property damage, are most often offered in comprehensive 
general liability (CGL) policies.37 These CGL policies, though issued by  
different insurance companies, are all derivatives of the same standard-    
form CGL policy.38  For the past few decades, the Insurance Services Office 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 427. 
 30. Id. at 419. 
 31. Id. at 419-21. 
 32. Id. at 420 (quoting Apana v. TIG Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 679, 680 (9th               
Cir. 2009)). 
 33. Id. at 424. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 425. 
 37. Reliance Nat. Ins. Co. v. Hatfield, 228 F.3d 909, 915-16 (8th Cir. 2000).  See 
generally George H. Tinker, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance – Perspec-
tive and Overview, 25 FED’N INS. COUNS. Q. 217 (1975). 
 38. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. AMSCO Windows, 921 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1231 
n.6 (D. Utah 2013); see also Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. 
4
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(ISO) has been, practically speaking, the exclusive promulgator of the   
standard CGL policy for the nation.39  Because of this, courts have been 
prone to take persuasive authority and apply it when interpreting provisions 
of CGL policies.40 
This section will examine the history behind pollution exclusion lan-
guage and the various forces that shaped its evolution.  Particular emphasis 
will be placed on the changes in the CGL policy that led to the pollution ex-
clusion clause in use today.  This section will then consider the language of 
today’s pollution exclusion clause and how courts, confronted with the 
clause, have interpreted it. 
A.  History Behind the Pollution Exclusion Clause 
1.  Accident-Based Coverage 
Before 1966, the standard CGL policy covered only property damage 
and personal injuries “caused by accident.”41  Although “accident” was not 
defined, insurance companies understood it to include an implicit requirement 
of suddenness.42  This suddenness requirement was expected to bar coverage 
for “less clear-cut gradual injury or damage which may emerge over an un-
certain period of time and in an uncertain area.”43  Specifically contemplated 
by this suddenness requirement were pollution-related injuries.44 
Courts, however, frequently construed “accident” more broadly, often 
reading the policy as encompassing any “unexpected, unforeseen and unde-
 
Supp. 1485, 1500-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(discussing history of the use of standard form policies). 
 39. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993).  ISO is a na-
tional insurance industry association comprised of approximately 1400 domestic 
property and casualty insurers.  Id. 
 40. 2 CAROLINE N. BROUN & JAMES T. O’REILLY, RCRA AND SUPERFUND: A 
PRACTICE GUIDE § 16:7 (3d ed. 2013). 
 41. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking 
Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1241 (1986). 
 42. See Gilbert L. Bean, The Accident Versus the Occurrence Concept, 1959 
INS. L.J. 550, 551 (1959). 
 43. Id. 
The . . . purpose of the [accident] phrase was to have coverage actuated by an 
identifiable event which is sudden, detrimental and fixed in time and place, ra-
ther than apply to the less clear-cut gradual injury or damage which may 
emerge over an uncertain period of time and in an uncertain area. The accident 
limitation was intended to carve out an easily identifiable area for coverage. 
Id. 
 44. See Thomas M. Reiter & John K. Baillie, Better Late Than Never: Holding 
Liability Insurers to Their Bargain Regarding Coverage for Unforeseen, Gradual 
Pollution, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 10-14 (1996). 
5
Gorman: Missouri Court Limits the Reach
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
418 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
signed happening or consequence from either a known or unknown cause.”45 
Some courts even explicitly rejected the implicit suddenness requirement.46  
For example, one Kentucky court stated that an “accident” as defined by a 
CGL policy “need not be a blow but may be a process . . . It is not required to 
be sudden . . . Where the accident is a process, how long is then not signifi-
cant whether it takes three hours, three weeks or months.”47   This more liberal 
judicial interpretation of “accident” and the lack of an enforced “suddenness” 
requirement allowed pollution-related injuries to easily fall within the con-
fines of a CGL policy.48 
2.  Occurrence-Based Coverage 
In 1966, the insurance industry, in an effort to narrow the scope of the 
standard CGL policy, changed the language so that it covered only injuries 
 
 45. Hauenstein v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 65 N.W.2d 122, 126 (Minn. 
1954); see, e.g., Knight v. L. H. Bossier, Inc., 118 So. 2d 700, 703 (La. Ct. App. 
1960) (defining an accident as “[a]n event happening without any human agency, or, 
if happening through such agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is unusu-
al and not expected by the person to whom it happens.”) (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 31 (4th ed. 1957)); Moffat v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 238 F. Supp. 
165, 169 (M.D. Pa. 1964) (defining an accident as “an event that takes place without 
one’s foresight or expectation”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Volentine, 578 S.W.2d 501, 
503 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (defining an accident as an “unexpected, unforeseen and 
undesigned happening”). 
 46. See, e.g., Singsaas v. Diederich, 238 N.W.2d  878, 881 (Minn. 1976). 
 47. Travelers v. Humming Bird Coal Co., 371 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Ky. 1963) (em-
phasis added). 
 48. See, e.g., Moore v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 295 P.2d 154, 156-58 (Cal. App. 
Dep’t Super. Ct. 1956) (drain clog caused by gradual accumulation of lint was cov-
ered by insured’s policy); Kissel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.W.2d 497, 505  
(Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (policy covered damages caused by sliding and sinking of earth 
at site of construction); Moffat v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 238 F. Supp. 165, 174 
(M.D. Pa. 1964) (gradual damage caused by emanation of destructive gases and   
mining constituted an “accident” within the meaning of the policy); Humming Bird 
Coal Co., 371 S.W.2d at 38 (damage to a landowner’s water supply caused by the 
insured’s strip mining operations was covered by insured’s policy); White v.       
Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497, 507-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (contamination of well arising 
from insured’s operation of slaughterhouse on adjoining premises was within cover-
age of liability policy); City of Kimball v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 
N.W.2d 632, 637-38 (Neb. 1973) (pollution of well due to seepage from city’s sew-
age lagoon was covered by city’s policy); Lansco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 350 
A.2d 520, 521-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (release of thousands of gallons of 
oil from tanks was considered “accidental” and therefore covered by the policy); 
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293, 1321 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(per curiam) (damage caused by the disposal of hazardous waste into pipelines was 
covered by insured’s policy). 
6
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caused by “occurrences.”49  The policy specified that an “occurrence” was   
an “accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, dur-
ing the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected       
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”50  This language was meant 
to counter the prevailing judicial interpretations of “accident” which had      
no requirement of “suddenness” and, thus, encompassed even the most grad-
ual environmental pollution claims.51  Insurers believed that this language 
would effectively deny coverage to commercial clients who knowingly     
polluted the environment.52  In other words, insurers assumed that this      
language would bar claims originally sought to be barred by the implicit 
“suddenness” requirement.53 
Yet courts continued to interpret the policies as covering “damages     
resulting from long-term, gradual exposure to environmental pollution.”54  
These courts reasoned that damages caused by intentional discharge of pollu-
tants qualified so long as the ultimate loss was neither intended nor           
expected.55  For instance, in Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Insur-
ance Co., residents of the Fairport Harbor village sued manufacturer Grand 
River Lime for damages caused by Grand River’s manufacturing practices.56  
The court, in that case, acknowledged that Grand River’s activities were  
“wilfull [sic] and intentional misfeasance” but, nevertheless, held that the 
actual damage arising from the manufacturing practices was unintentional.57  
The court explained that there was a difference between an insured’s inten-
tional practices and the unintentional damage that might result from said 
practices.58  The latter, the court reasoned, was still covered since the damage 
itself was unintentional.59 
 
 49. Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 849          
(N.J. 1993). 
 50. Nancer Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the 
Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610,     
624 (1990). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Rosenkranz, supra note 41, at 1247-48. 
 53. See id. 
 54. 2 STEVEN PLITT & JORDAN ROSS PLITT, PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR HANDLING 
INSURANCE CASES § 13:29 (2013); see also infra cases cited in note 55. 
 55. See New Castle Cnty. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 
1991); see also Jackson Twp. Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 451 
A.2d 990, 994-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982) (finding that while the city’s de-
positing of wastes in landfill was intentional, the seepage through soil and contamina-
tion of neighboring wells was not); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 
489 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (holding that a situation can constitute an “accident” if the 
resulting damage could be viewed as unintended by a fact finder). 
 56. Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 289 N.E.2d 360, 362-65 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1972). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 365. 
 59. Id. 
7
Gorman: Missouri Court Limits the Reach
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
420 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
3.  The Pollution Exclusion 
Around the time of the “occurrence” change in the standard CGL policy, 
Congress made substantial amendments to the Clean Air Act.60  These 
amendments, enacted to better protect the quality of the nation’s air,61 greatly 
increased the potential liability and financial responsibilities of insurers.62  A 
number of untimely large-scale environmental disasters (e.g., Times Beach, 
Love Canal, and Torrey Canyon) furthered compounded the economic plight 
of insurers.63 
As a result of this increase in litigation, the courts’ overbroad interpreta-
tion of “occurrence,” and the public’s newfound environmental conscious-
ness, the insurers again changed their policies.64  This change, which came in 
1970, appeared in the form of an exclusionary clause that applied specifically 
to pollution related claims: 
[T]his policy does not apply . . . to bodily injury or property damage 
arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, va-
pors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, 
waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or 
upon the land, the atmosphere, or any water course or body of water; 
but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release 
or escape is sudden and accidental. 65 
Under this language, only pollution-related losses that arose from occur-
rences both “sudden” and “accidental” were covered.66  The language also 
shifted the focus of the inquiry from the loss to the discharge that led to the 
 
 60. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amend-
ed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1983)). 
 61. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (amending the Clean Air Act). 
 62. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. 1463, 1469 (D. 
Kan. 1991); see, e.g., Christine F. Ericson, Comment, Excluding the Pollution Exclu-
sion: City of Johnstown, New York v. Bankers Standard Insurance Company, 877 
F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989), 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 287, 288 (1990); Rob-
ert D. Chesler, Michael L. Rodburg & Cornelius C. Smith, Jr., Patterns of Judicial 
Interpretation of Insurance Coverage for Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 
RUTGERS L.J. 9, 34-35 (1986). 
 63. Ctr. for Creative Studies v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 871 F. Supp. 941, 943-44 
(E.D. Mich. 1994).  See generally STEMPEL, supra note 1, at 825. 
 64. Rosenkranz, supra note 41, at 1251 n.73. 
 65. 35 MATTHEW KING, WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 20:11 (2013) (quoting the 
Insurance Rating Board form).  The exclusion first appeared in an endorsement to the 
policy.  Rebecca M. Bratspies, Splitting the Baby: Apportioning Environmental Lia-
bility Among Triggered Insurance Policies, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1215, 1224-25 (1999) 
(citing Robert S. Soderstrom, The Role of Insurance in Environmental Litigation, 11 
FORUM 762, 766 (1976)).  In 1973, however, it was integrated into the standard 
GCL policy as “exclusion (f)” in substantially the same form.  Id. 
 66. See KING, supra note 65, at § 20:11. 
8
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loss.67  Insurance companies hoped that these changes and the restoration of 
the suddenness requirement would reduce coverage and litigation.68  The 
following thirteen years, however, were riddled with lawsuits as litigants and 
courts struggled to make sense of the terms “sudden and accidental.”69 
Much of the litigation centered on whether the word “sudden” was 
meant in a strictly temporal sense.70  Courts noted that a strictly temporal 
interpretation would exclude damages in all pollution-related claims except 
those in which the discharge of pollution had been “abrupt.”71  Other courts, 
however, interpreted “sudden” more broadly.72  These courts held that insur-
ers were liable for pollution-related damages that were “unintended or unex-
pected.”73  No interpretation was uniformly adopted and so judicial construc-
tion of “sudden and accidental” varied from state to state – both in rationale 
and result.74 
For example, some courts, including courts in North Carolina, Massa-
chusetts, and Michigan, held that “sudden” was unambiguous and interpreted 
the term in the strictly temporal sense.75  These courts often relied on the 
common meaning of the word and thus construed “sudden” to mean “happen-
ing abruptly without prior notice.”76  These courts frequently noted that defin-
ing “sudden” as “unexpected” would render the word “accidental” meaning-
less because “accidental” also meant unexpected or unintended.77 
Nonetheless, other courts, including courts in Colorado, Georgia, New 
Jersey, and Washington, found the term to be ambiguous and construed it to 
mean “unintended or unexpected.”78  These courts often stressed that “sud-
 
 67. Rosenkranz, supra note 41, at 1252-53. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ill. 1997). 
 70. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1225 
(Ill. 1992). 
 71. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 80-81. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 80. 
 74. Porterfield v. Audubon Indem. Co., 856 So. 2d 789, 800 (Ala. 2002); see 
also Outboard Marine Corp., 607 N.E.2d at 1218. 
 75. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 1153, 1157 
(4th Cir. 1992) (finding that “sudden” is unambiguous and is understood to mean 
abrupt); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 
1988) (same); Waste Mgmt. of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 
381-83 (N.C. 1986) (same); Lumbermen Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 
N.E.2d 568, 572 (Mass. 1990) (same); Upjohn Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392, 
397 (Mich. 1991) (same). 
 76. Claudia G. Catalan, Annotation, Construction of Qualified Pollution Exclu-
sion Clause in Liability Insurance Policy, 88 A.L.R. 5TH 493 (2001). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1091-92 (Colo. 1991) 
(holding that “sudden” is ambiguous and should be interpreted to mean “unintended 
or unexpected”); Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989) 
(same); Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 528 A.2d 76, 83-86 
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den” as used in the pollution exclusion clause of an insurance policy was 
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.79  These courts further 
stated that any construction of the ambiguity, according to well-established 
rules of law, must be in favor of the insured.80  Consequently, the courts that 
found an ambiguity often held that “sudden” meant “unexpected.”81  In sup-
port of their interpretation, these courts often pointed out that various courts 
had construed the language of an insurance policy differently.82  These dis-
crepancies, the courts reasoned, were some indication of ambiguity.83 
B.  The Current Law 
1.  The Absolute Pollution Exclusion 
The enormous amount of litigation caused by the terms “sudden and ac-
cidental” forced insurance companies to once again draft a new version of the 
exclusion.84  The newest version, which became standard in the mid-1980s, is 
now commonly known as the “absolute pollution exclusion.”85  An early ver-
sion of the absolute pollution exclusion provided as follows: 
This policy does not apply: to bodily injury or property damage     
arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke,   
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, 
waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants . . . 
[whether or not] such discharge, dispersal, release, or escape is sudden 
or accidental.86 
 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (same); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van’s Westlake Un-
ion, Inc., 664 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (same). 
 79. Catalan, supra note 76, at 493. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Ballard, supra note 50, at 633. 
 85. Am. States Ins. Co v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 80-81 (Ill. 1997). 
 86. Mark S. Dennison, Insured’s Proof That Pollution Exclusion Clause Does 
Not Bar Coverage for Environmental Claims, 38 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 477 
(1996).  In 1986, the insurance industry adopted a more comprehensive version of the 
absolute pollution exclusion: 
This policy does not apply to . . . (f) (1) “Bodily injury” or “property damage” 
arising out of the actual alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or 
escape of pollutants: (a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy; (b) At 
or from any site or location used by or for you or others for the handling, stor-
age, disposal, processing or treatment of waste; (c) Which are at any time 
transported, handled, stored, treated, disposed of, or processed as waste by or 
for you or any person or organization for whom you may be legally responsi-
ble; or (d) At or from any site or location on which you or any contractors or 
10
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The absolute pollution exclusion differs from the original pollution ex-
clusion – sometimes known as the “qualified pollution exclusion” – in two 
significant ways.87  First, it removes the exception for “sudden and acci-
dental” pollution.  Second, it eliminates the language requiring the discharge 
to be “into the air, water, or land.”88 
2.  Judicial Interpretation 
This absolute pollution exclusion, however, has not brought litigation to 
a halt as the drafters hoped it would.  It has, instead, opened the door for new 
issues to litigate.89  The most recent issue, and the one most relevant to this 
Note, is whether the pollution exclusion clause as it appears today extends 
beyond “traditional environmental pollution.”90  This issue, in the words of 
one scholar, has “spurred heated litigation . . . and debate[]” with “policy-
holders and insurers divide[d] markedly in their view of the historical back-
ground of the pollution exclusion and the meaning of changes to the exclu-
sion’s language.”91 
Courts in Arizona, California, the District of Columbia, Illinois, New 
Jersey, Ohio, and Wyoming have held that the absolute pollution exclusion 
clause cannot extend beyond “traditional environmental pollutions.”92  These 
 
subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing 
operations: (i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the site or location in con-
nection with such operations; or (ii) if the operations are to test for, monitor, 
clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize the pollutants. (2) Any 
loss, cost or expense arising out of any governmental direction or request that 
you test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize 
pollutants. 
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, 
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. 
Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed. 
Id. 
 87. See Ballard, supra note 50, at 633. 
 88. Weaver v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 674 A.2d 975, 977 (N.H. 1996). 
 89. See NGM Ins. Co. v. Carolina’s Power Wash & Painting, LLC, No. CIV. 
2:08-CV-3378-DC, 2010 WL 146482, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 12, 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
NGM Ins. Co. v. Kuras, 407 F. App’x 653 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 90. See id. (“It is clear that a nationwide split of opinion exists regarding: (1) 
whether ‘absolute pollution exclusions’ bar coverage for incidents outside of tradi-
tional environmental pollution and (2) whether ‘absolute pollution exclusions’         
are unambiguous.”); see also Francis C. Amendola, Pollution, 46 C.J.S. Insurance     
§ 1381 (2013). 
 91. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the “Abso-
lute” Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 
TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 3, 6 (1998). 
 92. See, e.g., Keggi v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,13 P.3d 785, 792 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the absolute pollution exclusion was not intended to 
preclude coverage “absent any evidence that the actual [damage] arose from tradi-
tional environmental pollution”); MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1216 
11
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courts often emphasize the doctrine of reasonable expectations, which re-
quires courts to interpret pollution exclusion language in light of the reasona-
ble expectations of an ordinary policyholder.93 
In MacKinnon v. Truck Insurance Exchange, for example, the Supreme 
Court of California considered whether a pollution exclusion clause preclud-
ed coverage for damages after a tenant died from exposure to pesticide spray-
ing.94  The court first analyzed the basic principles governing the interpreta-
tion of insurance policy language.95  It concluded that the most fundamental 
rule of contract interpretation is that the interpretation must give effect to the 
“mutual intention” of the parties.96  The court further noted that a provision’s 
“clear and explicit” meaning must be interpreted in its “ordinary and popular 
sense,” unless it is “used by the parties in a technical sense or a special mean-
 
(Cal. 2003) (holding that the exclusion should be “limit[ed] [in] scope . . . to injuries 
arising from events commonly thought of as pollution, i.e. environmental pollution”); 
Richardson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 826 A.2d 310, 339 (D.C. 2003) (applying 
District of Columbia law) (finding that carbon monoxide poisoning caused by a mal-
functioning furnace is covered under the standard CGL policy), vacated on other 
grounds, 844 A.2d 344 (D.C. 2004); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 
82 (Ill. 1997) (holding that the scope of the “absolute” pollution exclusion is limited 
to traditional environmental contamination); Nav-Its, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of 
Am., 869 A.2d 929, 938 (N.J. 2005) (finding that the history of pollution exclusions 
makes it clear that the intent is to preclude coverage for traditional environmentally-
related damages only); Andersen v. Highland House Co., 757 N.E.2d 329, 334 (Ohio 
2001) (stating that the true purpose behind pollution exclusion clauses was to limit the 
“enormous expense and exposure resulting from the explosion of environmental liti-
gation”); Gainsco Ins. Co. v. Amaco Prod. Co., 53 P.3d 1051, 1066 (Wyo. 2002) 
(holding that the total pollution exclusion should be limited to “environmental pollu-
tion” claims). 
 93. See, e.g., Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. McFadden, 595 N.E.2d 762, 764 (Mass. 1992) 
(“When construing language in an insurance policy, we consider what an objectively 
reasonable insured reading the relevant policy language, would expect to be co-  
vered . . . .  We conclude that an insured could reasonably have understood the provi-
sion at issue to exclude coverage for injury caused by certain forms of industrial  
pollution, but not coverage for injury allegedly caused by the presence of leaded ma-
terials in a private residence.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quota-
tions omitted); Harrell v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 937 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Tenn. 1996) 
(refusing to honor insurance company’s intent, finding its use of language and pur-
ported distinctions “illusory and contrary to the normal expectations of the average 
policy holder”); Richardson, 826 A.2d at 314 (applying District of Columbia law) (“A 
reasonable person reading the [pollution exclusion] clause at the time it was written 
by the insurance industry. . . could fairly conclude that its language was fully con-
sistent with [the purpose of protecting insurers from enormous liability for environ-
mental damages], and that the exclusion therefore had no application to a malfunc-
tioning furnace [which caused carbon monoxide poisoning] in an apartment house.”). 
 94. MacKinnon, 73 P.3d at 1207. 
 95. Id. at 1212. 
 96. Id. at 1212-13. 
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ing is given to them by usage.”97  The court reasoned that the terms used in 
the standard absolute pollution exclusion clause supported an interpretation 
that limited the exclusion to damage from environmental pollution because 
terms like “discharge,” “dispersal,” “release,” and “escape” were commonly 
used to describe events of general environmental pollution.98 
A number of courts, however, including courts in Alabama, Alaska, 
Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, Virginia, and Wisconsin, have refused to ap-
ply the doctrine of reasonable expectations to the absolute pollution exclusion 
clause.99  These courts reason that the language of the absolute pollution ex-
clusion is clear and unambiguous.100  Consequently, the exclusion does not 
need a doctrine of reasonable expectations, or any other judicial device, to 
establish meaning. In fact, one Florida court stated candidly: 
We decline to adopt a doctrine of reasonable expectations.  There is no 
need for it if the policy provisions are unambiguous . . . .  To apply the 
 
 97. Id. at 1213 (citation omitted). 
 98. Id. at 1215-16 (“It may be an overstatement to declare that ‘discharge,    
dispersal, release or escape,’ by themselves, are environmental law terms of art.     
But . . . these terms, used in conjunction with ‘pollutant,’ commonly refer to the     
sort of conventional environmental pollution at which the pollution exclusion was 
primarily targeted.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Abston Petroleum, Inc., 967 So.2d 705, 
712, 714-15 (Ala. 2007) (precluding coverage for damages caused by an indoor gaso-
line leak and rejecting the insured’s argument that coverage should be afforded based 
on the ordinary policyholder’s “reasonable expectations”); Whittier Props., Inc. v. 
Alaska Nat’l Ins. Co., 185 P.3d 84, 90-91 (Alaska 2008) (holding that gasoline that 
leaked from insured’s service station was clearly a “pollutant” under the unambiguous 
terms of the policy); Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Roinestad, 296 P.3d 1020, 
1025 (Colo. 2013) (finding that insurance coverage may be excluded under absolute 
pollution exclusion clauses for both nontraditional and “traditional” pollution); Reed 
v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 667 S.E.2d 90, 91-92 (Ga. 2008) (holding that an absolute 
pollution exclusion precludes coverage for carbon monoxide poisoning claims against 
a landlord and finding that carbon monoxide was clearly a toxic fume within the ex-
clusion’s definition of a “pollutant”); Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 
N.W.2d 628, 636-39 (Minn. 2013) (holding that the release of carbon monoxide in-
side a house was excluded from coverage despite the insured’s argument that pollu-
tion exclusions should be limited to “environmental” releases); PBM Nutritionals, 
LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 724 S.E.2d 707, 714-15 (Va. 2012) (holding that pollution 
exclusions are not limited to “traditional environmental contamination losses”); 
Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 809 N.W.2d 529, 537 (Wis. 2012) (finding that 
damage to insured’s home from bat infestation was excluded from cover-
age because bat guano is “a solid, liquid, or gaseous irritant  or contaminant” and 
therefore a “pollutant”). 
 100. See Park-Ohio Indus., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 975 F.2d 1215, 1223 (6th 
Cir. 1992); Constitution State Ins. Co. v. Iso-Tex Inc., 61 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 
1995); Resure, Inc. v. Chem. Distribs., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 190, 194 (M.D. La. 1996), 
aff’d, 114 F.3d 1184 (5th Cir. 1997); see also cases cited supra note 99. 
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doctrine to an unambiguous provision would be to rewrite the contract 
and the basis upon which the premiums are charged.101 
These courts argue that application of the reasonable expectations     
doctrine in pollution exclusion cases creates nothing more than a convoluted 
mess.102  One federal district court, for example, held that “[c]onstruing   
insurance policies upon a determination as to whether the insured’s sub-
jective expectations are reasonable can only lead to uncertainty and unneces-
sary litigation.”103 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In American National Property & Casualty Co. v. Wyatt, the Missouri 
Court of Appeals for the Western District considered whether an insurance 
policy’s absolute pollution exclusion clause precluded coverage for injuries 
when said injuries were caused by the emission of carbon monoxide from a 
car accidentally left running in a garage.104  The Court of Appeals reversed 
the Jackson County Circuit Court’s judgment and entered summary judgment 
in favor of the plaintiffs.105  In an opinion drafted by Judge Joseph M. Ellis, 
all three judges agreed that the absolute pollution exclusion did not bar cov-
erage in such circumstances.106  The judges also agreed that an insured’s ex-
pectations of coverage should be honored when reasonable.107  The court 
reached this decision in three steps.  First, it considered the history of the 
pollution exclusion clause and the purpose behind it.108  Next, the court con-
sidered whether the pollution exclusion terms within the policy were ambigu-
ous.109  Finally, the court considered whether a reasonable person purchasing 
said policy would expect the pollution exclusion clause to preclude coverage 
in circumstances like the one at hand.110 
The court first assessed the history of the pollution exclusion clause and 
the forces that shaped its evolution.111  The clause’s various stages, the court 
observed, revealed a struggle for control between two independently motivat-
 
 101. Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So.2d 
1135, 1140 (Fla. 1998). 
 102. See, e.g., Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 801-06 
(Utah 1992); Deni Assocs., 711 So.2d at 1140. 
 103. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Wausau Bus. Ins. Co., 508 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1180 
(M.D. Fla. 2007) (quoting Deni Assocs., 711 So.2d at 1140). 
 104. Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Wyatt, 400 S.W.3d 417, 419 (Mo. App. W.D. 
2013), reh’g and/or transfer denied (Apr. 30, 2013). 
 105. Id. at 427. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 426. 
 108. Id. at 420-23. 
 109. Id. at 423-25. 
 110. Id. at 425-27. 
 111. Id. at 420-22. 
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ed powers.112  On one side of the struggle were the insurers who, in response 
to the public’s growing environmental consciousness, sought to extend the 
situations under which coverage was precluded.113  In their opposition were 
the courts that, despite insurer’s efforts, continued to interpret the policies in 
a way that afforded coverage.114  As succinctly summed up by the court, “the 
history of the pollution-exclusion clause in its various forms demonstrates 
that its purpose was to have a broad exclusion for traditional environmentally 
related damages.”115 
The court then addressed whether the pollution exclusion terms within 
the policy were ambiguous.116  It began by reciting the rules that structured its 
analysis.117  The court noted that interpreting an insurance policy and deter-
mining whether coverage and exclusion provisions were ambiguous are ques-
tions of law that must be reviewed de novo.118  Precedent further required the 
court to construe the terms of an insurance policy as “an ordinary person of 
average understanding purchasing this insurance” would construe them.119  
The court observed that a policy is ambiguous under Missouri law when it 
can be “reasonably and fairly” interpreted in more than one way.120  The ex-
istence of an ambiguity, it concluded, required an examination of the exclu-
sionary clause in the context of the entire policy.121 
The court then assessed the arguments presented by both sides.122  
ANPAC, it noted, relied heavily on a dictionary definition of “pollutant” 
which encompassed “any irritant or contaminant.”123  Using this definition as 
its basis, ANPAC asserted that the pollution clause excluded any injury 
caused by an irritant or contaminant.124  The court, however, rejected this 
interpretation of “pollution.”125  The court reasoned that a dictionary’s defini-
tion of a word is not sufficient proof of the “ordinary and popular” meaning 
 
 112. Id. at 419-23. 
 113. Id. at 420-23. 
 114. Id. at 419-23. 
 115. Id. at 422 (quoting Nav-Its, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 869 A.2d 929, 
936-37 (N.J. 2005)). 
 116. Id. at 419-21. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 419 (citing Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 509 (Mo. 2010)             
(en banc)). 
 119. Id. at 419-20 (quoting Schmitz v. Great Am. Assur. Co., 337 S.W.3d 700, 
705-06 (Mo. 2011) (en banc)). 
 120. Id. (citing Vega v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 162 S.W.3d 144, 147 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2005)). 
 121. Id. (citing Jensen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 349 S.W.3d 369, 377 (Mo. App.    
W.D. 2011)). 
 122. Id. at 420-25. 
 123. Id. at 424. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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of the word.126  It reasoned that a term within a policy must be read in the 
context of the entire policy as an ordinary person purchasing the policy would 
so read it.127  In other words, a term in a policy must derive its meaning with 
reference to the words around it and with respect to the meanings that it is 
given in daily life.128 
The court then considered the plaintiffs’ argument that a reasonable 
homeowner would not read the exclusionary provision so liberally.129  They 
argued that reasonable persons would instead see the clause as only reaching 
traditional environmental pollution.130  The court ultimately agreed with the 
plaintiffs stating, “It seems far more reasonable that a policyholder would 
understand the exclusion as being limited to irritants and contaminants com-
monly thought of as pollution and not as applying to every possible irritant or 
contaminant imaginable.”131  The court determined that the language was 
reasonably susceptible to different constructions and was, therefore, ambigu-
ous as a matter of law.132 
Finding the provision ambiguous, the court went on to assess whether a 
reasonable person would consider residential carbon monoxide poisoning to 
be precluded by the terms of the provision.133  ANPAC argued that even if the 
provision was not read to encompass all irritants and/or contaminants, a rea-
sonable person would still understand the clause to cover carbon monoxide 
poisoning because most people are aware of carbon monoxide and the dan-
gers associated with extended exposure to it.134  The court, however, found 
this argument unpersuasive because determining whether “a substance [is] a 
pollutant under the terms of a policy exclusion depend[s] on the context or 
environment in which the substance is involved.”135  The court reasoned that 
injuries caused by carbon monoxide inhalation in a residential setting would 
not be perceived by an ordinary person as “pollution.”136  Residential carbon 
monoxide was, therefore, not unambiguously excluded as a pollutant under 
the exclusion.137  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a number of 
cases from varying jurisdictions that also considered the applicability of the 
 
 126. Id. (quoting MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1213             
(Cal. 2003)). 
 127. Id. at 424-25 (quoting MacKinnon, 73 P.3d at 1213). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 419. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 425 (quoting Reg’l Bank of Colo. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
35 F.3d 494, 498 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (quoting Langone v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 731 N.W.2d 334, 340 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2007)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 425-26. 
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pollution exclusion clause with respect to residential carbon monoxide inhala-
tion injuries.138 
The court gave particular attention to MacKinnon v. Truck Insur-     
ance Exchange, in which an insured landlord was sued for damages after a 
tenant died from exposure to pesticide spraying.139  The Supreme Court        
of California held that the pollution exclusion clause did not preclude cover-
age for such an injury when it occurred in a residential context.140  Its       
conclusion, the court argued, was supported by the terms used in the policy’s 
pollution exclusion clause (e.g., discharge, dispersal, release, or escape)   
because these terms were commonly used to describe events of general    
environmental pollution.141 
MacKinnon’s rationale, the Wyatt court reasoned, applied to the facts   
in Wyatt.142  The court inferred that an insured could reasonably believe that 
“accidentally leaving a car running in a closed garage, thereby allowing   
carbon monoxide to accumulate in the garage and house” would not qualify 
as a “discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape” of pollu-
tants as used in the policy’s exclusion clause.143  The language of the        
pollution exclusion clause should, therefore, not preclude coverage for the 
injuries at hand.144 
In Wyatt, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District consid-
ered the extent of an insurance policy’s pollution exclusion clause.145          
By reading the clause in the context of the whole policy and bearing in mind 
the reasonable expectations of the ordinary policyholder, the court found that 
the policy’s pollution exclusion clause did not preclude coverage in claims 
for damages caused by exposure to carbon monoxide within the home.146 
V.  COMMENT 
In Wyatt, the court considered the scope of an insurance policy’s pollu-
tion exclusion clause.147  Although no Missouri court had squarely addressed 
the issue, the decision in Wyatt was unanimous.148  Wyatt established the fac-
 
 138. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
 140. See MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1218 (Cal. 2003). 
 141. Id. at 1215-16 (“It may be an overstatement to declare that ‘discharge,    
dispersal, release or escape,’ by themselves, are environmental law terms of art.     
But . . . these terms, used in conjunction with ‘pollutant,’ commonly refer to the     
sort of conventional environmental pollution at which the pollution exclusion was 
primarily targeted.”). 
 142. Wyatt, 400 S.W.3d at 426. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. at 419. 
 146. Id. at 426-27. 
 147. Id. at 419. 
 148. Id. at 427. 
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tors that a Missouri court must contemplate when determining the extent of 
an insurance policy’s pollution exclusion clause.149  It held that a court must 
consider the meaning of the clause within context of the policy as a whole 
and the way that the clause would be understood by the ordinary policyhold-
er.150  In rejecting the insurers’ all-excluding interpretation, Wyatt more accu-
rately conforms with the history behind the pollution exclusion clause.151 
Wyatt’s narrower reading of the clause makes sense considering the 
principles that govern judicial interpretation of insurance policies in Missouri.  
Under Missouri law, an ordinary policyholder’s reasonable expectations must 
be taken into consideration when interpreting the actual policy at hand.152  It 
is undisputed that policyholders purchase insurance for protection.153  Policy-
holders further understand their insurance policies as providing them “with 
the broadest spectrum of protection against liability for unintentional and 
unexpected personal injury or property damage arising out of the conduct of 
[their] business.”154  Thus, a reasonable person purchasing a homeowner’s 
insurance policy would expect coverage for any significant risk of injury re-
lated to homeownership.  Because carbon monoxide poisoning is “one of the 
more significant and well-known risks of injury related to homeownership in 
this country[,]” an ordinary person purchasing a homeowner’s policy would 
reasonably expect that the policy covered such a risk.155  The court in Wyatt 
agreed with this reasoning and set a precedent that requires Missouri courts to 
interpret exclusionary clauses in a way that does not invalidate the purpose 
for which the policy was purchased.156 
The holding in Wyatt also prevents Missouri courts from reaching ab-
surd results.  ANPAC, in arguing that the pollution exclusion clause preclud-
ed coverage, emphasized that a “pollutant” was “any irritant or contami-
nant.”157  This definition, however, reaches far beyond what an ordinary per-
son would consider a pollutant.  In fact, under this theory, the pollution ex-
clusion clause precludes from coverage any injury caused by anything that 
can “irritate” or “contaminate.”158  This interpretation of “pollutant” would, in 
effect, make the pollution exclusion clause boundless because almost every 
substance and chemical in existence can irritate or damage some person or 
 
 149. Id. at 419-20. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 421. 
 152. Schmitz v. Great Am. Assur. Co., 337 S.W.3d 700, 705-06 (Mo. 2011) (en 
banc) (“When interpreting the terms of an insurance policy, this Court applies the 
meaning that would be understood by an ordinary person of average understanding 
purchasing the insurance.”). 
 153. Peters, supra note 2, at 166. 
 154. Id.; see also MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1213             
(Cal. 2003). 
 155. Wyatt, 400 S.W.3d at 426-27. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 424. 
 158. Id. 
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property.159  Wyatt ensures that Missouri courts are not encumbered with 
arguments that hinge on the various linguistic implications of a single word.  
In fact, Wyatt’s focus on context and the “ordinary person” prevents lawyers 
who are trained “to parse careful arguments and to pay close attention to the 
meaning of individual words” from eliciting absurd or anomalous results.160 
Wyatt’s holding also discourages frivolous litigation.  An all-
encompassing reading of “pollutant,” like the one suggested by ANPAC, 
would open the floodgates to waves of new non-liability suits.161  For exam-
ple, since the adoption of the absolute pollution exclusion, insurance       
companies have tried to evade coverage in claims involving property damage 
from lake water,162 injuries caused to a child after playing with a bottle of 
carpet-dye,163 damages stemming from an ammonia spill in an office,164     
and injuries from a vehicular collision caused by reduced visibility from the 
smoke of a non-hostile fire.165  In fact, one court stated that such a broad in-
terpretation of the absolute pollution exclusion could result in litigation over 
whether the injuries from a gunshot were precluded by the clause, since the 
“person [was] ‘polluted’ by being struck in the face by a speeding bullet.”166  
Thus, the holding in Wyatt is not only sensible but also judicially prudent, 
considering the quantity of litigation that accompanies such a broad interpre-
tation of “pollutant.”167 
The decision reached in Wyatt also better comports with the history of 
pollution exclusion language.168  The evolution of the pollution exclusion 
clause was largely a reaction to increased environment regulations by the 
government, the public’s newfound environmental conscience, and a number 
 
 159. Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 728, 732 (Wis. 1997). 
 160. Jolliff v. N.L.R.B., 513 F.3d 600, 616 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 161. See Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 
1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that a broad reading of “pollutant” could instigate 
litigation over whether a pollution exclusion clause barred coverage “for bodily inju-
ries suffered by one who slips and falls on the spilled contents of a bottle of Drano” or 
“for bodily injury caused by an allergic reaction to chlorine in a public pool” and that 
“although Drano and chlorine are both irritants or contaminants that cause, under 
certain conditions, bodily injury or property damage, one would not ordinarily charac-
terize [the previously described] events as pollution”). 
 162. Purity Spring Resort v. TIG Ins. Co., No. CIV. 99-295-JD, 2000 WL 
1507429 (D.N.H. July 18, 2000). 
 163. Regent Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 835 F. Supp. 579, 580-81 (D. Kan. 1993). 
 164. Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. 711 So. 2d 
1135, 1136-37 (Fla. 1998). 
 165. Perkins Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 378 S.E.2d 407, 
408 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
 166. See In re Idleair Techs. Corp., No. 08-10960(KG), 2009 WL 413117, at *8 
(D. Del. Feb. 18, 2009) (quoting Bodine v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 150364 (Cal. 
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1992)). 
 167. See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra Part III.A. 
19
Gorman: Missouri Court Limits the Reach
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
432 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
of untimely large-scale environmental disasters.169  Consequently, any judi-
cial interpretation of pollution exclusion language should complement, not 
contradict, the historical forces that shaped it.  In the same vein, the clause 
should not be expanded to exclude instances that were not originally contem-
plated or considered.  To do so would be to deny the well-documented under-
standing of the term and give it new meaning.  Wyatt, by reaching its conclu-
sion only after recounting the history of the pollution exclusion, demonstrates 
that exclusionary clauses are best interpreted and explained when their pur-
pose and shaping forces are explored and understood. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Wyatt, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District held 
that the pollution exclusion clause did not exclude carbon monoxide inhala-
tion in residential circumstances.170 Wyatt established a precedent under 
which the interpretation of insurance language depends on the history and 
forces that shaped it.  Thus, the court in Wyatt did not reach its holding until 
it acknowledged and analyzed the original intention and historical purpose of 
the pollution exclusion.171 
The decision in Wyatt also places a greater emphasis on the reasonable 
expectations of policyholders.  Given how important assent is to a contract, 
the holding in Wyatt should be viewed as a huge step forward.  It forces in-
surance companies to cover claims that a reasonable policyholder would ex-
pect to be covered.  It further comports with the reasons for which persons 
purchase CGL policies in the first place.  In other words, Wyatt, by making 
insurance companies liable for damages caused by non-traditional pollutants, 
ensures that policyholders who purchase insurance for protection actually 
receive the protection that they need and expect. 
 
 
 169. See supra Part III.A. 
 170. Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Wyatt, 400 S.W.3d 417, 426-27 (Mo. App. 
W.D. 2013), reh’g and/or transfer denied (Apr. 30, 2013). 
 171. Id. 
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